浙江农业学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 2567-2582.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.2022.11.25
• 农业经济与发展 • 上一篇
城乡要素共生背景下的土地入股双层多方利益博弈主体合作机制
李娟1(
), 庄晋财2, 郑晶晶3,*()
- 1.桂林电子科技大学 商学院,广西 桂林 541004
2.江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013
3.中南大学 商学院,湖南 长沙 410083
-
收稿日期:2021-04-25出版日期:2022-11-25发布日期:2022-11-29 -
通讯作者:郑晶晶 -
作者简介:*郑晶晶,E-mail:lijuanguilin6@163.com
李娟(1990—),女,广西桂林人,博士,讲师,研究方向为创业与区域农村发展。E-mail:juanli1266@126.com -
基金资助:国家社会科学基金(19BGL149);广西哲学社会科学规划研究课题(21FSH021);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划(KYCX18_2210)
Land-shareholding double-layer multi-party interest game cooperation mechanism under background of integration of urban and rural factors
LI Juan1(), ZHUANG Jincai2, ZHENG Jingjing3,*()
- 1. School of Business, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin 541004, Guangxi, China
2. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, China
3. Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
-
Received:2021-04-25Online:2022-11-25Published:2022-11-29 -
Contact:ZHENG Jingjing
摘要：
在城乡要素共生背景下,为了探寻土地入股多方参与主体的合作机制,从理论层面建立双层多方演化博弈模型,对地方政府、资本下乡企业、农户、集体经济组织4方参与土地入股合作的利益博弈关系进行剖析,得到各方合作的稳定策略,并基于对内蒙古固阳县马铃薯专业合作社的调查,对多方合作演化博弈模型的稳定策略选择进行验证性分析。研究发现,土地增值收益的合理分配、政府的政策奖励、土地入股合作参与主体的心理预期收益,以及对合谋行为的惩罚力度等都对土地入股合作的稳定性产生较大影响。为构建土地入股四方主体的合作机制,提出如下建议:拓展土地入股合作,提高超额收益;提高违约金,降低各方违约的概率;减少额外收益,提高各方合作的稳定性;根据入股比例确定利益分配系数,提高利益分配均衡性;提高政府奖励与农户获取的其他收入,调动各方合作积极性;提高集体经济组织所得酬劳,增强合作积极性;增大对集体经济组织合谋的惩罚,遏制合谋行为的发生。
中图分类号:
引用本文
李娟, 庄晋财, 郑晶晶. 城乡要素共生背景下的土地入股双层多方利益博弈主体合作机制[J]. 浙江农业学报, 2022, 34(11): 2567-2582.
LI Juan, ZHUANG Jincai, ZHENG Jingjing. Land-shareholding double-layer multi-party interest game cooperation mechanism under background of integration of urban and rural factors[J]. Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis, 2022, 34(11): 2567-2582.
使用本文
表1 地方政府与直接参与主体的收益矩阵
Table 1 Income matrix of local governments and direct participating subject
| 策略组合Strategy portfolio | 直接参与主体Directly participating subject | 地方政府Local government |
|---|---|---|
| 合作,鼓励Cooperation, encourage | G+ΔP+A1-C-S | I+S-A1-K |
| 合作,不鼓励Cooperation, discourage | G+ΔP-C | I |
| 不合作,鼓励Noncooperation, encourage | G+A1 | I-A1 |
| 不合作,不鼓励Noncooperation, discourage | G | I |
表1 地方政府与直接参与主体的收益矩阵
Table 1 Income matrix of local governments and direct participating subject
| 策略组合Strategy portfolio | 直接参与主体Directly participating subject | 地方政府Local government |
|---|---|---|
| 合作,鼓励Cooperation, encourage | G+ΔP+A1-C-S | I+S-A1-K |
| 合作,不鼓励Cooperation, discourage | G+ΔP-C | I |
| 不合作,鼓励Noncooperation, encourage | G+A1 | I-A1 |
| 不合作,不鼓励Noncooperation, discourage | G | I |
表2 资本下乡企业、农户、集体经济组织在不同策略组合下的收益矩阵
Table 2 Income matrix of capital enterprise, farmer, and collective economic organization under different strategy combinations
| 策略组合 Strategy portfolio | 资本下乡企业 Capital enterprise | 农户 Farmer | 集体经济组织 Collective economic organization |
|---|---|---|---|
| 合作,合作,鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, encourage | P1+βΔP+A1-C1 | P2+(1-β)ΔP+A2-L-C2 | R1+L |
| 合作,合作,不鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, discourage | P1+βΔP-C1 | P2+(1-β)ΔP+A2-C2 | R2 |
| 合作,不合作,鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, encourage | P1+A1+E-C1 | P2+P4-E | -N |
| 合作,不合作,不鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, discourage | P1+E-C1 | P2+P4-E | 0 |
| 不合作,合作,鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, encourage | P1+P3-E | P2+E-L-C2 | L-N |
| 不合作,合作,不鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, discourage | P1+P3-E | P2+E-C2 | 0 |
| 不合作,不合作,鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, encourage | P1 | P2 | 0 |
| 不合作,不合作,不鼓励 | P1 | P2 | 0 |
| Noncooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
表2 资本下乡企业、农户、集体经济组织在不同策略组合下的收益矩阵
Table 2 Income matrix of capital enterprise, farmer, and collective economic organization under different strategy combinations
| 策略组合 Strategy portfolio | 资本下乡企业 Capital enterprise | 农户 Farmer | 集体经济组织 Collective economic organization |
|---|---|---|---|
| 合作,合作,鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, encourage | P1+βΔP+A1-C1 | P2+(1-β)ΔP+A2-L-C2 | R1+L |
| 合作,合作,不鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, discourage | P1+βΔP-C1 | P2+(1-β)ΔP+A2-C2 | R2 |
| 合作,不合作,鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, encourage | P1+A1+E-C1 | P2+P4-E | -N |
| 合作,不合作,不鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, discourage | P1+E-C1 | P2+P4-E | 0 |
| 不合作,合作,鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, encourage | P1+P3-E | P2+E-L-C2 | L-N |
| 不合作,合作,不鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, discourage | P1+P3-E | P2+E-C2 | 0 |
| 不合作,不合作,鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, encourage | P1 | P2 | 0 |
| 不合作,不合作,不鼓励 | P1 | P2 | 0 |
| Noncooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
表3 三方初始状态的空间组合与策略选择
Table 3 Initial state space combination and strategy selection of three parties
| 博弈收敛与平衡点 Game convergence and equilibrium point | 资本下乡企业、农户和集体经济组织的策略选择 Strategic choices of capital enterprises, farmers and collective economic organizations |
|---|---|
| a=1,b=1,c=1 | 合作、合作、鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, encourage |
| a=1,b=1,c=0 | 合作、合作、不鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, discourage |
| a=1,b=0,c=1 | 合作、不合作、鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, encourage |
| a=1,b=0,c=0 | 合作、不合作、不鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
| a=0,b=1,c=1 | 不合作、合作、鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, encourage |
| a=0,b=1,c=0 | 不合作、合作、不鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, discourage |
| a=0,b=0,c=1 | 不合作、不合作、鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, encourage |
| a=0,b=0,c=0 | 不合作、不合作、不鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
表3 三方初始状态的空间组合与策略选择
Table 3 Initial state space combination and strategy selection of three parties
| 博弈收敛与平衡点 Game convergence and equilibrium point | 资本下乡企业、农户和集体经济组织的策略选择 Strategic choices of capital enterprises, farmers and collective economic organizations |
|---|---|
| a=1,b=1,c=1 | 合作、合作、鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, encourage |
| a=1,b=1,c=0 | 合作、合作、不鼓励Cooperation, cooperation, discourage |
| a=1,b=0,c=1 | 合作、不合作、鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, encourage |
| a=1,b=0,c=0 | 合作、不合作、不鼓励Cooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
| a=0,b=1,c=1 | 不合作、合作、鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, encourage |
| a=0,b=1,c=0 | 不合作、合作、不鼓励Noncooperation, cooperation, discourage |
| a=0,b=0,c=1 | 不合作、不合作、鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, encourage |
| a=0,b=0,c=0 | 不合作、不合作、不鼓励Noncooperation, noncooperation, discourage |
表4 内蒙古固阳县马铃薯专业合作社的变量数值
Table 4 Numeric value of variables of potato cooperatives in Guyang County, Inner Mongolia
| 变量 Variable | 数值 Numerical value | 数据来源 Data source |
|---|---|---|
| P1/yuan | 320 000 | 合作社成立之前各合伙人年收入之和 The sum of the annual income of each partner before the establishment of the cooperative |
| P2/yuan | 100 000 | 入股合作社之前各农户家庭种植农作物获取的年收入之和 The sum of the annual household income from planting crops before joining the cooperative |
| ΔP/yuan | 1 200 000 | 合作社主营业务收入、其他业务收入和营业外收入之和 The sum of the cooperative’s main business income, other business income and non-operating income |
| β | 0.7 | 合伙人共同持有合作社股份的比例 Proportion of cooperative shares held by partners |
| P3/yuan | 900 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,合伙人违约而投资其他项目所获得的预期收益 Affected by the psychological expected return, the expected return obtained by the partner defaulting on the investment in other projects |
| P4/yuan | 500 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,农户违约而将土地用于其他途径所获得的预期收益 Affected by the psychological expected returns, the expected benefits obtained by farmers defaulting on the use of land for other means |
| E/yuan | 150 000 | 合作一方违约所支付的违约金 Liquidated damages paid by the cooperating party for breach of contract |
| C1/yuan | 400 000 | 合作社用于修建存储仓库、晾场、道路、水利基础设施,购置农机设备,引进分层施肥、生物菌剂应用等先进技术等的费用 Expenditures of cooperatives on construction of storage warehouses, drying yards, roads, water conservancy infrastructure, and purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment, and application of advanced technologies such as layered fertilization and biological agents |
| C2/yuan | 140 000 | 农户处理土地入股合作协商事宜的经费、支付给土地价值评估机构的酬劳 Funds paid by farmers on negotiation of land shareholding cooperation, and the remuneration paid to the land value assessment agency |
| A1/yuan | 250 000 | 合作社获得的省级财政扶持资金,包括财政补贴、财政转移支付、税收优惠、政策奖励等 The provincial financial support funds obtained by cooperatives, including financial subsidies, fiscal transfer payments, tax incentives, policy incentives, etc |
| A2/yuan | 150 000 | 农户外出务工所获收入和成为合作社雇佣员工所获收入 Income of farmers from outdoor labor, income from becoming employees of cooperatives |
| L/yuan | 200 000 | 村集体从农户手中获取的红利分成收益 The dividend sharing income obtained by the village collective from the farmers |
| R1/yuan | 300 000 | 村集体因吸引马铃薯加工企业、科研机构前来投资建立加工厂、研究基地所获得的收益,合作社给予的灰色收益 The income obtained by the village collective by attracting potato processing enterprises and scientific research institutions to invest in the establishment of processing plants and research bases, and grey income from cooperatives |
| R2/yuan | 350 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,村集体不支持合作并将土地用于其他项目所得的土地转让收益 Affected by the psychological expected benefits, the income obtained by the village collective from land transfer other than supporting cooperation |
| N/yuan | 100 000 | 村集体出现合谋行为所受到的惩罚Punishment for collusion in the village collective |
表4 内蒙古固阳县马铃薯专业合作社的变量数值
Table 4 Numeric value of variables of potato cooperatives in Guyang County, Inner Mongolia
| 变量 Variable | 数值 Numerical value | 数据来源 Data source |
|---|---|---|
| P1/yuan | 320 000 | 合作社成立之前各合伙人年收入之和 The sum of the annual income of each partner before the establishment of the cooperative |
| P2/yuan | 100 000 | 入股合作社之前各农户家庭种植农作物获取的年收入之和 The sum of the annual household income from planting crops before joining the cooperative |
| ΔP/yuan | 1 200 000 | 合作社主营业务收入、其他业务收入和营业外收入之和 The sum of the cooperative’s main business income, other business income and non-operating income |
| β | 0.7 | 合伙人共同持有合作社股份的比例 Proportion of cooperative shares held by partners |
| P3/yuan | 900 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,合伙人违约而投资其他项目所获得的预期收益 Affected by the psychological expected return, the expected return obtained by the partner defaulting on the investment in other projects |
| P4/yuan | 500 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,农户违约而将土地用于其他途径所获得的预期收益 Affected by the psychological expected returns, the expected benefits obtained by farmers defaulting on the use of land for other means |
| E/yuan | 150 000 | 合作一方违约所支付的违约金 Liquidated damages paid by the cooperating party for breach of contract |
| C1/yuan | 400 000 | 合作社用于修建存储仓库、晾场、道路、水利基础设施,购置农机设备,引进分层施肥、生物菌剂应用等先进技术等的费用 Expenditures of cooperatives on construction of storage warehouses, drying yards, roads, water conservancy infrastructure, and purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment, and application of advanced technologies such as layered fertilization and biological agents |
| C2/yuan | 140 000 | 农户处理土地入股合作协商事宜的经费、支付给土地价值评估机构的酬劳 Funds paid by farmers on negotiation of land shareholding cooperation, and the remuneration paid to the land value assessment agency |
| A1/yuan | 250 000 | 合作社获得的省级财政扶持资金,包括财政补贴、财政转移支付、税收优惠、政策奖励等 The provincial financial support funds obtained by cooperatives, including financial subsidies, fiscal transfer payments, tax incentives, policy incentives, etc |
| A2/yuan | 150 000 | 农户外出务工所获收入和成为合作社雇佣员工所获收入 Income of farmers from outdoor labor, income from becoming employees of cooperatives |
| L/yuan | 200 000 | 村集体从农户手中获取的红利分成收益 The dividend sharing income obtained by the village collective from the farmers |
| R1/yuan | 300 000 | 村集体因吸引马铃薯加工企业、科研机构前来投资建立加工厂、研究基地所获得的收益,合作社给予的灰色收益 The income obtained by the village collective by attracting potato processing enterprises and scientific research institutions to invest in the establishment of processing plants and research bases, and grey income from cooperatives |
| R2/yuan | 350 000 | 受心理预期收益影响,村集体不支持合作并将土地用于其他项目所得的土地转让收益 Affected by the psychological expected benefits, the income obtained by the village collective from land transfer other than supporting cooperation |
| N/yuan | 100 000 | 村集体出现合谋行为所受到的惩罚Punishment for collusion in the village collective |
图1 超额收益对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.1 Influence of excess returns on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
图1 超额收益对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.1 Influence of excess returns on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
图2 分配系数对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.2 Influence of distribution coefficient on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
图2 分配系数对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.2 Influence of distribution coefficient on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
图3 专业合作社违约额外收益对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.3 Influence of extra benefits of cooperative’s default on evolution of trilateral co-opetition
图3 专业合作社违约额外收益对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.3 Influence of extra benefits of cooperative’s default on evolution of trilateral co-opetition
图4 政府奖励对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.4 Influence of government rewards on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
图4 政府奖励对三方竞合关系演化的影响
Fig.4 Influence of government rewards on evolution of tripartite co-opetition
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