浙江农业学报 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 881-893.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.20230171

• 环境科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

农业面源污染多元主体协同治理策略的演化分析

郑巧巧(), 虎陈霞()   

  1. 中国计量大学 经济与管理学院,浙江 杭州 310018
  • 收稿日期:2023-02-15 出版日期:2024-04-25 发布日期:2024-04-29
  • 作者简介:郑巧巧(1998—),女,浙江温州人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为农业面源污染治理。E-mail:1248234349@qq.com
  • 通讯作者: *虎陈霞,E-mail:hcx115@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金(20BJY085);浙江省软科学研究计划重点项目(2021C25009)

Evolutionary game analysis on multi-subject collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution

ZHENG Qiaoqiao(), HU Chenxia()   

  1. College of Economics & Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
  • Received:2023-02-15 Online:2024-04-25 Published:2024-04-29
  • Contact: HU Chenxia

摘要:

有机肥替代化肥是降低氮磷污染概率,减轻农业面源污染的有效途径。当前,政府正全力应对的生态污染问题,但利益相关者间的利益冲突使政策难以发挥预期效力。为此,从肥料的生产和流通环节着手,构建包含政府、农用肥料生产企业、农户的演化博弈模型,从市场供需角度探究初始意愿、奖惩制度、成本和收益等因素对有机肥替代政策执行效率的影响,进而探索农业面源污染多元主体协同治理路径。结果表明:共有3组演化稳定的策略组合,分别为(宽松监管,不生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥)、(宽松监管,生产商品有机肥,替代化肥)和(严格监管,不生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥)。有机肥替代行为的获利能力是使结果稳定于(宽松监管,生产商品有机肥,替代化肥)的关键。肥料市场的供需平衡是博弈均衡的实质,其中,企业的初始意愿对结果更具导向性。三方主体的决策过程具备利益导向特征,在财政支持范围内加大奖惩力度可提高企业与农户生产、施用商品有机肥的意愿。据此,建议政府以经济效益为宣传导向,通过强化环保宣传教育、合理制定经济政策、搭建技术合作平台等污染治理路径,构建起协同治理的长效机制。

关键词: 农业面源污染, 有机肥替代化肥, 协同治理, 演化博弈

Abstract:

Organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer is an effective way to reduce the probability of nitrogen and phosphorus pollution and to mitigate agricultural non-point source pollution. Now, local governments in China are carrying out measures to combat the ecological pollution, but the conflicting interests among stakeholders make it difficult to achieve the desired result. Aimed at the production and circulation of fertilizers, an evolutionary game model among tripartite stakeholders was constructed in the present study, including local governments, fertilizer manufacturing enterprises and farmers, to explore the impact of initial willingness, reward and punishment policies, costs and benefits on the implementation efficiency of the organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer policy from the perspective of market supply and demand, and then to propose multi-subject collaborative governance paths of agricultural non-point source pollution. It was shown that there were three stable strategies of the model, including (loose supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers), (loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers), and (strict supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers). The profitability of organic fertilizers was the key to get (loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers). The balance of supply and demand in the fertilizer market was the essence for achieving game equilibrium, and the initial willingness of enterprises had a greater guiding effect on the result than that of farmers. The decision-making process of tripartite stakeholders was interest-oriented. Therefore, within the scope of financial support, increasing incentives and penalties could improve the willingness of enterprises and farmers to produce and apply organic fertilizers. Thus, it is suggested that the local governments should take economic benefits as the promotion guide and build up a long-term mechanism for collaborative management through strengthening environmental education and promotion, formulating economic policies rationally, and building technological cooperation platforms.

Key words: agricultural non-point source pollution, organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer, collaborative governance, evolutionary game

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