Evolutionary game analysis on multi-subject collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.20230171

Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 881-893.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.20230171

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Evolutionary game analysis on multi-subject collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution

ZHENG Qiaoqiao(), HU Chenxia()

College of Economics & Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2023-02-15 Online:2024-04-25 Published:2024-04-29
Contact: HU Chenxia

Abstract

Abstract:

Organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer is an effective way to reduce the probability of nitrogen and phosphorus pollution and to mitigate agricultural non-point source pollution. Now, local governments in China are carrying out measures to combat the ecological pollution, but the conflicting interests among stakeholders make it difficult to achieve the desired result. Aimed at the production and circulation of fertilizers, an evolutionary game model among tripartite stakeholders was constructed in the present study, including local governments, fertilizer manufacturing enterprises and farmers, to explore the impact of initial willingness, reward and punishment policies, costs and benefits on the implementation efficiency of the organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer policy from the perspective of market supply and demand, and then to propose multi-subject collaborative governance paths of agricultural non-point source pollution. It was shown that there were three stable strategies of the model, including (loose supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers), (loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers), and (strict supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers). The profitability of organic fertilizers was the key to get (loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers). The balance of supply and demand in the fertilizer market was the essence for achieving game equilibrium, and the initial willingness of enterprises had a greater guiding effect on the result than that of farmers. The decision-making process of tripartite stakeholders was interest-oriented. Therefore, within the scope of financial support, increasing incentives and penalties could improve the willingness of enterprises and farmers to produce and apply organic fertilizers. Thus, it is suggested that the local governments should take economic benefits as the promotion guide and build up a long-term mechanism for collaborative management through strengthening environmental education and promotion, formulating economic policies rationally, and building technological cooperation platforms.

Key words: agricultural non-point source pollution, organic fertilizer replacing chemical fertilizer, collaborative governance, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

ZHENG Qiaoqiao, HU Chenxia. Evolutionary game analysis on multi-subject collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution[J]. Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis, 2024, 36(4): 881-893.

Figures/Tables 10

Table 1 Benefit matrix of the evolutionary game participants

策略组合Strategy portfolios	政府Local governments	企业Enterprises	农户Farmers
严格监管,生产商品有机肥,替代化肥 Strict supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gh-S_p-S_i+ R_e+0.5aF_p	S_p-0.5C_ph-0.5C_pl+ R_p-0.5aF_p	S_i-0.5C_ih-0.5C_il+ R_ih-0.5aD_i
严格监管,生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥 Strict supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gh-S_p+R_e+ 0.5aF_p	S_p-0.5C_ph-0.5C_pl+ 0.5R_p-0.5aF_p	-0.5C_il+R_il-0.5aD_i
严格监管,不生产商品有机肥,替代化肥 Strict supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gh+R_e+aF_p	-C_pl+0.5R_p-aF_p	-0.5C_il+R_il-0.5aD_i
严格监管,不生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥 Strict supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gh-C_e-F_g+aF_p	-C_pl+R_p-aF_p	-C_il+R_ih-aD_i
宽松监管,生产商品有机肥,替代化肥 Loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gl+R_e	-0.5C_ph-0.5C_pl+R_p	-0.5C_ih-0.5C_il+ R_ih-0.5aD_i
宽松监管,生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥 Loose supervising, producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gl+R_e	-0.5C_ph-0.5C_pl+0.5R_p	-0.5C_il+R_il-0.5aD_i
宽松监管,不生产商品有机肥,替代化肥 Loose supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gl+R_e	-C_pl+0.5R_p	-0.5C_il+R_il-0.5aD_i
宽松监管,不生产商品有机肥,不替代化肥 Loose supervising, not producing commercial organic fertilizers, not replacing chemical fertilizers	-C_gl-C_e-F_g	-C_pl+R_p	-C_il+R_ih-aD_i

Table 2 Stability analysis of equilibrium points

序号 Number	均衡点 Equilibrium points	特征值 Eigenvalues	渐进稳定条件 Conditions of asymptotic stability
1	(0,0,0)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} + a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} - R_{p}); 0.5 C_{i l} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l}) + 0.5 a D_{i}$	情景1 Scenario 1
2	(0,0,1)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} + a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} + R_{p}); R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i l} - 0.5 a D_{i}$	不稳定Instability
3	(0,1,0)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} - S_{p} + 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} + R_{p}); R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i h}$	不稳定Instability
4	(0,1,1)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} - S_{i} - S_{p} + 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} - R_{p}); 0.5 C_{i h} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l})$	情景2 Scenario 2
5	(1,0,0)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} - a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} - R_{p} + a F_{p}) + S_{p}; 0.5 C_{i l} + 0.5 a D_{i} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l})$	情景3 Scenario 3
6	(1,0,1)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} - a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} + R_{p} + a F_{p}) + S_{p}; R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i l} - 0.5 a D_{i}$	不稳定Instability
7	(1,1,0)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} + S_{p} - 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} + R_{p} - a F_{p}) - S_{p}; R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i h} + S_{i}$	不稳定Instability
8	(1,1,1)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} + S_{i} + S_{p} - 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} - R_{p} - a F_{p}) - S_{p}; 0.5 C_{i h} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l}) - S_{i}$	不稳定Instability

Table 2 Stability analysis of equilibrium points

序号 Number	均衡点 Equilibrium points	特征值 Eigenvalues	渐进稳定条件 Conditions of asymptotic stability
1	(0,0,0)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} + a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} - R_{p}); 0.5 C_{i l} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l}) + 0.5 a D_{i}$	情景1 Scenario 1
2	(0,0,1)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} + a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} + R_{p}); R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i l} - 0.5 a D_{i}$	不稳定Instability
3	(0,1,0)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} - S_{p} + 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} + R_{p}); R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i h}$	不稳定Instability
4	(0,1,1)	$C_{g l} - C_{g h} - S_{i} - S_{p} + 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} - R_{p}); 0.5 C_{i h} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l})$	情景2 Scenario 2
5	(1,0,0)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} - a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} - R_{p} + a F_{p}) + S_{p}; 0.5 C_{i l} + 0.5 a D_{i} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l})$	情景3 Scenario 3
6	(1,0,1)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} - a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p l} - C_{p h} + R_{p} + a F_{p}) + S_{p}; R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i l} - 0.5 a D_{i}$	不稳定Instability
7	(1,1,0)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} + S_{p} - 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} + R_{p} - a F_{p}) - S_{p}; R_{i h} - R_{i l} - 0.5 C_{i h} + S_{i}$	不稳定Instability
8	(1,1,1)	$C_{g h} - C_{g l} + S_{i} + S_{p} - 0.5 a F_{p}; 0.5 (C_{p h} - C_{p l} - R_{p} - a F_{p}) - S_{p}; 0.5 C_{i h} - (R_{i h} - R_{i l}) - S_{i}$	不稳定Instability

Fig.1 The influence of subjects’ initial willingness on system evolution path

Fig.2 The influence of violation penalties (Fp) on system evolution path

Fig.3 The influence of production subsidy for enterprises (Sp) on system evolution path

Fig.4 The influence of price subsidy for farmers (Si) on system evolution path

Fig.5 The influence of regulatory strategy cost differences (Cgh-Cgl) on system evolution path

Fig.6 The influence of production strategy cost differences (Cph-Cpl) on system evolution path

Fig.7 The influence of fertilizer application strategy cost differences (Cih-Cil) on system evolution path

Fig.8 The path of multi-subject collaborative governance

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Evolutionary game analysis on multi-subject collaborative governance of agricultural non-point source pollution

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