Analysis of evolutionary game among government, enterprises and farmers in the digital transformation of formulated fertilizer subsidies aimed at reducing fertilizer use and enhancing efficiency

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.20240843

Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (7): 1567-1579.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-1524.20240843

• Agricultural Economy and Development • Previous Articles Next Articles

Analysis of evolutionary game among government, enterprises and farmers in the digital transformation of formulated fertilizer subsidies aimed at reducing fertilizer use and enhancing efficiency

ZHANG Min(), ZHANG Yang(), SHEN Jing, HU Chenxia

College of Economics & Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2024-10-02 Online:2025-07-25 Published:2025-08-20

Abstract

Abstract:

To continuously promote the fertilizer reduction and efficiency increment, and explore feasible ways to achieve the digital transformation of subsides for formulated fertilizers, a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed in the present study involving local governments, agricultural supplies stores and farming entities. The internal mechanisms behind local governments’ empowerment of the subsidy process through digital transformation, incentivizing agricultural supplies stores to actively participate in digital platforms, and guiding various farming entities to purchase formulated fertilizers were studied, thereby achieving the goals of fertilizer reduction and efficiency increment. It was revealed that the local governments’ implementation of digital transformation for formulated fertilizer subsidies could effectively reduce the cost of subsidy application and issuance, not only strengthening the willingness of farming entities to purchase formulated fertilizers, but also enhancing the effectiveness of subsidy policies. Meanwhile, moderate financial subsidies could ensure the sustained progress of local governments’ digital transformation. Reducing the cost of agricultural supplies stores’ participation in digital platforms could facilitate their active involvement and strengthen the close cooperation between local governments and these stores, hence enhance the overall effectiveness of the digital platform and motivate farming entities to purchase fertilizers according to the formula. Based on these findings, suggestions were recommended: strengthening local governments’ responsibility for digital services and promoting the digital transformation of formulated fertilizer subsidies; actively exploring government-enterprise cooperation models to alleviate the burden on governments in digital transformation and service provision; and leveraging the bridging role of agricultural supplies stores to facilitate farming entities’ deep integration into digital life.

Key words: digital transformation, fertilizer reduction and efficiency increment, subsidies for formulated fertilizers, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F323.22

ZHANG Min, ZHANG Yang, SHEN Jing, HU Chenxia. Analysis of evolutionary game among government, enterprises and farmers in the digital transformation of formulated fertilizer subsidies aimed at reducing fertilizer use and enhancing efficiency[J]. Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis, 2025, 37(7): 1567-1579.

Figures/Tables 7

Table 1 Benefit matrix of participants in the evolutionary game

策略组合 Strategy portfolios	地方政府 Local governments	农资店 Agricultural supplies stores	种植主体 Farming entities
(1,1,1)	R₁+E₁+L₁-C₁-(1-a)T₁-(B₁+B₂)Q	E₂+(B₁+P₂-P₁)Q+R₂-C₂	R₃+E₃+ΔR₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-(1-c)T₂
(1,1,0)	R₁-C₁-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-C₂-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(1,0,1)	R₁+E₁+bL₁-C₁-T₁-QB₂	E₂+(P₂-P₁)Q-ΔL₂	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(1,0,0)	R₁-C₁-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(0,1,1)	E₁-T₁-(B₁+B₂)Q	E₂+(B₁+P₂-P₁)Q	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(0,1,0)	-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(0,0,1)	E₁-T₁-B₂Q	E₂+(P₂-P₁)Q	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(0,0,0)	-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*

Table 1 Benefit matrix of participants in the evolutionary game

策略组合 Strategy portfolios	地方政府 Local governments	农资店 Agricultural supplies stores	种植主体 Farming entities
(1,1,1)	R₁+E₁+L₁-C₁-(1-a)T₁-(B₁+B₂)Q	E₂+(B₁+P₂-P₁)Q+R₂-C₂	R₃+E₃+ΔR₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-(1-c)T₂
(1,1,0)	R₁-C₁-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-C₂-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(1,0,1)	R₁+E₁+bL₁-C₁-T₁-QB₂	E₂+(P₂-P₁)Q-ΔL₂	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(1,0,0)	R₁-C₁-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(0,1,1)	E₁-T₁-(B₁+B₂)Q	E₂+(B₁+P₂-P₁)Q	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(0,1,0)	-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*
(0,0,1)	E₁-T₁-B₂Q	E₂+(P₂-P₁)Q	R₃+E₃+(B₂-P₂)Q-T₂
(0,0,0)	-ΔE₁-S₁-ΔL₁	( $P 2 $ - $P 1 $ )Q^*-ΔE₂	$R 3 $ -ΔE₃- $P 2 $ Q^*

Table 2 Stability analysis of equilibrium points

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值λ₁ Eigenvalues λ₁	特征值λ₂ Eigenvalues λ₂	特征值λ₃ Eigenvalues λ₃	符号 Symbol	稳定性判断 Stability assessment
E₁(0,0,0)	ε₁	0	ε₈	(×, 0,×)	不稳定Instability
E₂(0,1,0)	ε₁	0	ε₈	(×, 0,×)	不稳定Instability
E₃(1,0,0)	-ε₁	ε₅	ε₈	(×,-,×)	不确定Uncertain
E₄(1,1,0)	-ε₁	-ε₅	ε₈+ε₉	(×,+,×)	不稳定Instability
E₅(0,0,1)	ε₁+ε₃	ε₆	-ε₈	(×,+,×)	不稳定Instability
E₆(0,1,1)	ε₁+ε₂+ε₄	-ε₆	-ε₈	(×,-,×)	不确定Uncertain
E₇(1,0,1)	-ε₁-ε₃	ε₅+ε₆+ε₇	-ε₈	(×,×,×)	不确定Uncertain
E₈(1,1,1)	-ε₁-ε₂-ε₄	-ε₅-ε₆-ε₇	-ε₈-ε₉	(×,×,×)	不确定Uncertain

Fig.1 Simulation of initial strategy of three-party game p represents the probability of each subject choosing their own strategy, and t represents the number of simulations. The same as below.

Fig.2 Impact of financial subsidies obtained by local governments on the evolutionary path of the system R1 represents financial subsidies obtained by local governments, with the unit of 104 yuan.

Fig.3 Impact of cost reduction of online subsidy issuance by local governments on the evolutionary path of the system a represents the cost reduction of local governments with online subsidy issuance.

Fig.4 Impact of the cost of agricultural supplies stores’s participation in digital platform on the evolutionary path of the system C2 represents the cost of agricultural supplies stores's participation in digital platform, with the unit of 104 yuan.

Fig.5 Impact of the cost reduction of online subsidy applications by farming entities on the evolutionary path of the system c represents the cost reduction of farming entities with online subsidy applications.

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Analysis of evolutionary game among government, enterprises and farmers in the digital transformation of formulated fertilizer subsidies aimed at reducing fertilizer use and enhancing efficiency

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